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Abstract 
The authors investigate the employment consequences of minimum wage regulation in 16 
OECD countries, 1970-2008. Their treatment is motivated by Neumark and Wascher’s 
(2004) seminal cross-country study. Apart from the longer time interval examined, a major 
departure is the authors’ focus on prime-age females, a group often neglected in the 
minimum wage literature. Another is their deployment of time-varying policy and institutional 
regressors. The average effects they report are consistent with minimum wages causing 
material employment losses among the target group. Their secondary finding is that 
minimum wage increases are more associated with (reduced) participation rates than with 
elevated joblessness. Further, although the authors find common ground with Neumark and 
Wascher as regards the role of some individual labor market institutions and policies, they do 
not observe the same patterns in the institutional data. Specifically, prime-age females do 
not exhibit stronger employment losses in countries with the least regulated markets.  
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1 
1. Introduction 
 
There is comparatively little cross-country evidence on the effects of minimum 
wages on employment. This contrasts with the truly enormous literature on minimum 
wages. What evidence we have is contained in just two main empirical inquiries: an early 
study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1998) 
looking at the effect of minimum wages on the employment-to-population ratio of both 
teenagers and young persons (as well as adults) for a sample of between 7 and 9 OECD 
countries, 1975-1996, and Neumark and Wascher‟s (2004) expanded analysis in this 
Review of 17 OECD nations, 1975-2000, focusing on teenagers and young adults (aged 
15 to 24 years) but again looking at the employment-to-population ratio.  
 By contrast, the parallel and burgeoning literature on employment protection is 
largely rooted in cross-country comparisons. And importantly Neumark and Wascher‟s 
minimum wage study draws heavily (and presciently) on arguments from this literature 
that might be expected either to amplify or moderate the employment consequences of 
minimum wages (on which more below).
1
 Their study does not share the same breadth of 
outcome indicator, however, focusing instead on disemployment and eschewing consid-
eration of labor-force participation and unemployment rates or other outcome indicators 
such as average hours worked. 
In the present treatment, while further updating the period of analysis, we also 
seek to link the minimum wage and employment protection literatures. But our target 
group differs critically from that traditionally examined in the two literatures and espe-
                                                 
1
 This is an oversimplification to the extent that the existence of a minimum wage is sometimes present in 
the employment protection literature, where it is aggregated in a general measure of labor market 
(in)flexibility. 
2 
cially the minimum wage literature. That is, we will look at the labor market effects of 
minimum wages on workers other than teenagers and youths that are also at risk from 
wage minima, namely females aged 25 to 54 years. To the extent that this group of 
prime-age females includes low-productivity labor – reflecting their historically lower 
human capital accumulation due to interruptions in labor market experience and more 
limited access to education and training – the bite of minimum wages can also be 
expected to be material, and presumably more so in developing nations (Ozturk, 2006). 
The impact of minimum wages may be underscored by the higher-valued outside options 
of females, which in turn suggests that a wider range of outcomes other than employment 
might usefully be considered, to include participation rates. Furthermore, the existence of 
youth subminima that have been found to ameliorate the adverse consequences of mini-
mum wages among that target group might be expected to have just the opposite effect 
among adult females.  
„Policy complementarities‟ invoked by the wider literature are also examined. To 
this end, we examine all the labor market institutions considered by Neumark and 
Wascher (2004) in their innovative analysis.
2
 As an additional refinement, we introduce 
time-varying measures of most such arguments. Only labor standards and in part the 
mechanics of minimum wage setting are one-off measures.  
 
2. Previous Research 
As mentioned earlier, despite the plethora of research on the employment and 
other consequences of minimum wages (see Neumark and Wascher, 2007), there is scant 
                                                 
2
 We also considered the role of other labor market institutional and policy variables such as the tax wedge 
and the degree of coordination in collective bargaining, as well as some other mainstream arguments such 
as the output-gap. These proved mostly statistically insignificant and are not further discussed here. 
3 
cross-country analysis exploiting the tremendous variation in minimum wages by nation 
state.
3
 As further noted, the two principal analyses using panel data for industrialized 
nations are those of the OECD (1998) and Neumark and Wascher (2004). 
The OECD study looks at the effect of minimum wages on the employment of 
teenagers, young adults, and prime-age adults for a small sample of countries, 1975-
1996.
4 
The countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, and the United States. However, for the gender analysis, the sample is 
reduced to seven counties because of the lack of adequate series of average wages for 
Portugal and Spain. 
The regressions follow the state-level panel data specifications now standard in 
the U.S. minimum wage literature. The dependent variable for the full sample is the em-
ployment-to-population ratio for teenagers aged 15 to 19 years, youths aged 20 to 24 
years, and adults aged 25 to 54 years. For the reduced seven-country sample, separate 
male and female subsamples of each group are used. The key minimum wage ratio is cal-
culated separately for each group using the relevant average wage and allowing for youth 
rates where applicable. The employment population ratio is regressed on the ratio of 
minimum to median wages with controls for the business cycle (the prime-age male un-
employment rate and/or the output gap), different institutional features (but see below), 
country trend effects, and fixed country effects.  
Increases in the minimum wage measure are reported to have a negative impact 
on teenage employment across all specifications, albeit in some instances attendant upon 
the exclusion of Portugal and Spain. For the full (partial) sample of countries, in the 
                                                 
3
 Although, for meta-analyses, see Card and Krueger (1995) and Boockmann (2010). 
4
 Note that the OECD study ranges further afield to investigate the impact of minimum wages on poverty 
and the income distribution and on wages and the wage distribution. 
4 
study‟s preferred specifications – with corrections for first-order autocorrelation for the 
error terms and heteroscedasticity across countries – a 10 percent increase in the mini-
mum wage is associated with a fall in teenage employment of between 1.5 and 2 (2.7 and 
4.1) percent. On the other hand, for young adults aged 20 to 24 years and for adult prime 
age males and females the elasticities are seldom statistically significant.
5
  
The OECD study does not consider the role of labor market institutions/policies 
other than union density, the unemployment insurance (UI) replacement rate, and non-
wage labor costs as a proportion of total costs (i.e. the tax wedge). (Nor for that matter 
does it report the respective coefficient estimates, just a summary of the estimated 
employment elasticities, partially documented above.) Of course, empirical analysis of 
the consequences of employment protection in particular has mushroomed since Lazear‟s 
(1990) pioneering study. Now-familiar institutions examined in addition to employment 
protection include active labor market policies, coordination in collective bargaining, and 
labor standards (e.g. Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell and Layard, 1999). More recent develop-
ments have allowed for interactions between institutions and economic shocks and 
between the institutions themselves (e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Addison and 
Teixeira, 2003; Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel, 2005).
6 
Yet more recent innovations have 
included the role of product market and business regulation, quality of industrial rela-
tions, and even family ties and religion (see, inter al., Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Fiori et 
al., 2007; Addison and Teixeira, 2009, Alesina et al., 2010; Feldmann, 2007). Unlike the 
minimum wage literature, most such analyses have focused on cross-country differences.  
                                                 
5
 Among teenagers, female elasticities always exceeded those of males but no such gender pattern obtained 
in the cases of youths and adults. 
6
 Coe and Snower (1997) were the first to provide the theoretical basis for expecting complementarities 
between the various labor market policies including the minimum wage. 
5 
The study by Neumark and Wascher (2004) is notable in attempting to bridge the 
gap between these two literatures, even if minimum wages have sometimes figured in the 
armory of labor market policies investigated in aggregate. Specifically, Neumark and 
Wascher investigate the effect of minimum wages on teenage and youth employment for 
seventeen countries over the (maximum) sample period 1976-2000. These countries 
include, in addition to those examined by the OECD (1998), Italy, Australia, Germany, 
Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. 
The dependent variable is the employment-to-population ratio for the particular 
demographic, although the minimum wage argument – the ratio of the minimum wage to 
the median wage – uses the adult minimum wage in the numerator and the all-worker 
average in the denominator. Neumark and Wascher‟s basic equation regresses the 
employment measure on a one-year lag of the minimum-to-median wage ratio, and con-
trols for aggregate economic conditions and supply-side forces in the form of the adult 
unemployment rate and the ratio of the youth population to the adult population, respec-
tively. The authors provide results for a simple OLS specification, fixed effect models 
with and without controls for year effects and time trends, and a dynamic version of the 
model estimated using the GMM technique. In all cases, including the latter, they obtain 
well-determined negative coefficient estimates for the minimum wage variable. For 
young adults the minimum wage elasticities range from -0.13 to -0.28, and for teenagers 
from -0.09 to -0.31.   
The authors then augment their basic estimating equations with variables 
representing (a) characteristics of the minimum wage system, and (b) other labor market 
policies and institutions. Included under (a) a bargained minimum wage (the omitted 
6 
category is statutory minimum wage determination), subnational industry/regional wage 
minima, and youth subminima. Abstracting from the independent effects of the different 
types of minimum wage machinery, and focusing on the interaction terms from the 
authors‟ fixed effect and GMM specifications, it is reported that bargained minima are 
associated with a smaller negative employment impact of minimum wages and 
conversely where there are industry or geographic wage floors. As expected, youth sub-
minima reduce the adverse effects of minimum wages on young persons‟ employment, 
especially in the case of teenagers. 
The institutions included under (b) are labor standards, employment protection, 
active labor market policies, the unemployment insurance (UI) replacement rate, and 
union density.
7
 Again focusing on results from the preferred fixed effect and GMM 
specifications, the authors find evidence of certain complementarities. Thus, more 
restrictive labor standards and higher union density tend to exacerbate the disemployment 
effects of minimum wages, while stricter employment protection and active labor market 
policies appear to have the opposite effect. Of the institutional variables, only UI 
replacement rates appear to bear no relation to minimum wages – even if their indepen-
dent effect is seemingly to reduce employment. 
In a final application, Neumark and Wascher seek to erect a typology of minimum 
wage countries and investigate their component minimum wage elasticities. The catego-
ries are fourfold: high employment protection/active labor market policies in combination 
with either high or low labor standards and low employment protection/active labor mar-
ket policies again in combination with either high or low labor standards. It emerges that 
                                                 
7
 The authors exclude from these regressions the prior institutional arrangements centering on the 
mechanics of minimum wage setting. 
7 
negative employment minimum wage effects are strongest for the group of countries 
having the least regulation, namely Canada, Japan, the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  
 
3. Theoretical Backdrop and Econometric Specification 
 The theoretical model in this paper is implicit. It is in the spirit of Cahuc and 
Zylberberg (1999) and Coe and Snower (1997). Cahuc and Zylberberg offer a dynamic 
search and matching model with wage negotiations and employment protection (viz. 
severance payments and limitations on dismissals), and introduce minimum wage setting 
into this framework to study its impact on job creation and job destruction. Their model 
implies that employment protection may strongly elevate unemployment of lower skilled 
workers when the minimum wage is high but have little impact where the minimum wage 
is low (or when wages are flexible). For their part, Coe and Snower develop a model of 
policy complementarities and show that policies/institutions that affect the bargaining 
power of incumbent employees, or that influence the search behavior of the unemployed, 
or that influence barriers to job creation can have complementary effects on unemploy-
ment such that minimum-wage like measures that cost jobs can be magnified or ameli-
orated according to the restrictiveness of the ruling labor market environment. Both 
models, then, capture the interaction of minimum wages with labor market rigidities and 
labor force characteristics, and imply that minima will be less disruptive when policies 
are less rigid.
8
 
                                                 
8
 For theoretical implications based on the conjunction of wage rigidity and mandated benefits, see Kahn 
(2010). 
8 
The more obvious component of the model is the extent to which the minimum 
wage is effective. When the minimum wage is binding, the demand curve determines the 
level of employment for the given minimum wage; otherwise, equilibrium employment is 
a function of both demand and supply. We do not model the determinants of the proba-
bility that the minimum wage will bind (see, inter al., Neumark and Wascher, 2002; 
Addison et al., 2011) but simply attempt to capture its bite here by expressing the mini-
mum wage as a ratio of the median wage.
9
 (As the latter argument is only available for all 
workers, we supplement it with a measure of the gender wage gap interacted with the 
minimum wage. The argument here is that the smaller the gap between males and 
females, the greater the implied relative skill level of females and the less likely they are 
to be adversely impacted by hikes in the minimum wage, although we will subsequently 
address the potential endogeneity of this variable.) Use of the minimum to median wage 
ratio also reduces the bias arising from the correlation between minimum wage levels and 
macroeconomic events affecting minimum wage levels. 
Our econometric specification is as follows:  
         
39,,1;16,,1
 111

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               (1) 
where Yit is the prime-age female employment rate in country i and time t; MWit-1 is the 
minimum-to-median wage ratio; Xit and Zi are the time-varying and time-invariant supply, 
demand, and institutional arguments, respectively; αi indexes fixed country effects and λt 
fixed year effects; θi captures the time trends in the outcome indicator for country i; and 
it  is an error term. The data cover 16 countries and the time frame is 1970 to 2008. 
                                                 
9
 On the superiority of expressing the minimum wage as a ratio of the median as opposed to the average 
wage in international comparisons, see OECD (1998: 38). 
9 
Observe that although our primary focus is upon the adult female employment rate, we 
will also consider the corresponding labor force participation and unemployment rates as 
in the employment protection literature.
10
 
The time-varying arguments in the vector Xit comprise our three base regressors 
and four conventional institutional regressors. The former comprise the adult male unem-
ployment rate, the fertility rate, and the wage gap. The latter include employment protec-
tion, union density, the unemployment insurance (UI) replacement rate, and active labor 
market policies. Finally, the time-invariant arguments in the vector Zi are two-fold: the 
labor standards index and the presence of a youth subminimum wage. Were it not for 
changes in the way minimum wages are fixed in the United Kingdom all three component 
measures of the minimum wage machinery would also have been time invariant. Given 
those changes, however, both bargained minimum wages and the presence of wage floors 
differentiated by region and/or industry are now time varying, albeit identified by the 
British changes alone, leaving only the youth subminimum component time invariant. 
But note that all institutional components of the vectors Xit and Zi are interacted with the 
lagged minimum wage measure.  
 OLS and fixed effect versions of equation (1) were run. Additionally, we esti-
mated our preferred dynamic version of the model by including the (relevant) lagged 
dependent variable as a regressor. As noted earlier, the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1981) is used to estimate the 
dynamic model. 
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 After Lazear (1990), we contemplated also using average hours as a dependent variable but did not 
proceed with this indicator because female hours were available for just one-half of our sample. 
10 
4. Data 
The data used in this inquiry are gathered from OECD online databases and pub-
lished resources, and from the CEP-OECD Institutions Data Set (Nickell, 2006). The data 
in question cover employment-to-population ratios, unemployment rates, labor force 
participation rates, adult male unemployment rates (as a business cycle control), mini-
mum wages and minimum wage rules, measures of labor market rigidity, the gender 
wage gap, and the fertility rate. OECD data on minimum wages are available where a 
national minimum wage is set by statute or by a national collective bargaining agreement. 
For countries where no national minimum exists, but where industry- or occupation-
specific minima are set by legislation or collective bargaining agreements, we use sum-
mary estimates constructed by Dolado et al. (1996) as our base measure, following 
Neumark and Washer (2004). These estimates relate the minimum wage to average 
wages whereas the corresponding OECD values are based on the minimum-to-median 
wage ratio. However, a referee suggested that the data for the Nordic countries – here 
Sweden, Denmark, and Finland – were inappropriately low. In response to this concern, 
we re-estimated our employment models (a) dropping the Nordic group and (b) since 
most of the observations for the Nordic group pertain to Sweden, retaining the Nordic 
group but substituting four separate „sectors‟ for that country drawing on data kindly 
provided by Per Skedinger.
11
 The sectors in question are retail trade, hotels and restau-
rants, food and bakeries, and an across-sector measure obtained by averaging in the cor-
responding ratios for engineering, construction and slaughter houses to data from the 
three aforementioned sectors. However, in order to preserve ready comparisons with the 
earlier literature, our main tables preserve the Dolado et al. data, remitting our sensitivity 
analysis and the new estimations to appendix tables.   
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 See Skedinger (2010). 
11 
 
 
 
First Observation Last Observation Average
Australia 0.65 (1985) 0.52 0.60 no no yes <21
Belgium 0.54 (1975) 0.5 0.54 yes no yes <21
Canada 0.48 0.41 0.41 no yes Province no
Denmark 0.55 0.54 (1994) 0.54 yes yes Industry yes <18
Finland 0.52 (1993) 0.52 (1993) 0.52 yes yes Industry yes <18
France 0.42 0.62 0.54 no no no Limited
Germany 0.57 0.58 (1994) 0.59 yes yes Industry no Some
Ireland 0.67 (2000) 0.52 0.54 no no yes <18
Italy 0.78 (1976) 0.71 (1991) 0.73 yes yes Industry no Some
Japan 0.78 (1975) 0.34 0.31 no yes Prefecture no
The Netherlands 0.58 0.42 0.52 no no yes <23
New Zealand 0.6 0.59 0.52 no no yes <20
Spain 0.7 0.44 0.43 no no yes <18
Sweden
0.53 (1975) 0.51
0.53                          
(0.79/0.80/0.83/0.73) yes yes Industry yes <24
United Kingdom 0.365 0.46 0.44 yes/no
Wages Councils  [up 
to 1993] / statute 
(after 1999)
yes /no [Industry] yes <21
United States 0.49 0.34 0.38 no yes State no Limited
Note: The information in the first and second columns refers to minimum-to-median (or minimum-to-mean) wage ratios in 1970 and 1978, respectively, unless otherwise stated. The figures
in the third column give average values for the relevant ratio. The higher values shown here in parentheses for Sweden are taken from Skedinger (2010) and give minimum-to-mean wage
ratios for four separate sectors (see text). The series from which the latter are drawn are used in our sensitivity analysis.
Sources: Minimum-to-median wage ratios are taken from the OECD online database for all countries, other than Denmark, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (before 1933)
where we use estimates constructed by Dolado et al. (1996) as our base measure following Neumark and Wascher (2004). Minimum wage rules are from Neumark and Wascher (2004: 228)
and the ILO TRAVAIL Legal database.
Table 1.  Minimum Wage Levels and Rules
Country
Bargained Minimum Wage Presence of Subnational 
Minimum Wage
Presence of Youth 
Subminimum Wage
Minimum-to-Median Wage Ratio
12 
Most OECD countries have some sort of minimum wage policy. Table 1 provides 
information on these minima, as well as the machinery of minimum wage determination, 
for those countries for which we have been able to assemble consistent data on all 
variables. As is immediately evident, the countries differ not only in terms of the relative 
level of minimum wages – and hence in the potential bite of minimum wages – but also 
in rule setting. The first two columns of the table give the relative values of the minimum 
wage at two points in time, namely 1970 and 2008, unless otherwise stated. For most 
countries, minimum-to-median (or minimum-to-mean) wage ratios declined through 
time; the principal exceptions being France and the United Kingdom. European countries 
generally have higher relative values of the minimum wage than their non-European 
counterparts, including the United States. This empirical regularity has of course been 
noted in the wider literature and, taken in conjunction with the greater degree of labor 
market regulation obtaining in Europe, cited as a principal cause of that region‟s high un-
employment rates (e.g. Siebert, 1997). We also give average values of the minimum 
wage in the third column of the table. The figures in parentheses for Sweden are taken 
from Skedinger (2010) and give the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage in 
the four sectors mentioned earlier. As is evident, each value exceeds the Dolado et al. 
measure.   
The last three columns of Table 1 describe the minimum wage fixing machinery. 
The first indicates how minimum wages are determined. Here „yes‟ signifies that the 
minimum wage is negotiated (i.e. set via bipartite or tripartite negotiations), while „no‟ 
signifies the wage is set by statute. For the United Kingdom we observe a switch in 
regimes from bargained (via tripartite wages councils) to statutory minimum wages over 
13 
the sample period. The fourth column shows whether the minimum wage is national in 
scope or instead varies across industries or regions; for example, in Japan the minimum 
wage varies across prefectures, whereas in the United States each state can set its own 
minimum exceeding the federal level.
12 
For our sample of countries, regional and 
industry variation is more common than a unified national minimum. The final column of 
the table indicates whether there are any subminimum wages for younger persons and, if 
so, the age at which they apply.
13
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 The „new minimum wage research‟ in the United States has used this geographic variation to help 
identify employment effects, albeit in quite different ways (cf. Neumark and Wascher, 1992; Card and 
Krueger, 1994).   
13
 As noted by Neumark and Wascher (2004: note 18), the classification of minimum wage systems is 
inevitably open to some discretion, especially with respect to youth subminima. We follow their convention 
in treating the cases of Italy, France, Germany and the United States, where there is some such limited 
wage differentiation as having no such differentiation. On the broader question of Germany, where the 
differentiation stems from its famous apprenticeship system, there is of course the very much wider issue of 
whether that nation is properly classified as having minimum wages at all – at least prior to the recent 
posted workers act and latterly the introduction of minima for individual sectors such waste disposal. As a 
practical matter, the exclusion of Germany did not materially affect any of the major findings reported 
below or earlier; full results are available from the authors upon request. 
14 
 
Country
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
The Netherlands
New Zealand
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
Total
correlation with the lagged 
minimum wage measure
0.068 (0.044)
0.287 (0.070)
0.225 (0.090)
-0.716
Sources: The labor market indicators (including unemployment rates) are taken from the OECD.Stat online data base. Fertility rates are from the OECD
Family data base. The wage gap is the difference between median male and female wages expressed as a percentage of the male median wage. This variable
is generated using OECD data. The mean wage ratio is used instead for The Netherlands, downloaded from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/59/39606921.xls. The
fertility rate and wage gap variables are standardized for the regressions.
0.042 0.155 0.508 0.773
0.619 (0.152) 0.664 (0.156)
0.806 (0.066) 0.836 (0.072) 0.036 (0.022) 1.778 (0.174) 0.172 (0.019)
1.814 (0.400)
0.653 (0.088) 0.688 (0.089) 0.052 (0.012) 1.968 (0.149)
0.691 (0.036) 0.726 (0.031) 0.048 (0.014) 2.152 (0.330) 0.162 (0.069)
0.701 (0.045) 0.742 (0.033) 0.057 (0.021) 1.829 (0.175) 0.307 (0.075)
0.603 (0.050) 0.621 (0.058) 0.028 (0.012) 1.619 (0.272) 0.379 (0.038)
0.403 (0.131) 0.479 (0.164) 0.145 (0.085) 1.765 90.630) 0.231 (0.060)
0.469 (0.162) 0.509 (0.161) 0.084 (0.051) 2.523 (0.702) 0.190 (0.045)
0.518 (0.184) 0.548 (0.193) 0.054 (0.033) 1.682 (0.223) 0.237 (0.046)
0.643 (0.076) 0.705 (0.098) 0.084 (0.033) 1.903 (0.203) 0.164 (0.058)
0.444 (0.097) 0.490 (0.117) 0.088 (0.039) 1.561 (0.394) 0.166 (0.011)
0.792 (0.023) 0.848 (0.018) 0.066 (0.021) 1.719 (0.171) 0.132 (0.012)
0.611 (0.091) 0.657 (0.112) 0.066 (0.027) 1.442 (0.163) 0.252 (0.022)
0.609 (0.087) 0.678 (0.077) 0.104 (0.031) 1.709 (0.170) 0.122 (0.031)
0.785 (0.040) 0.831 (0.042) 0.055 (0.035) 1.727 (0.086) 0.227 (0.026)
Table 2a. Means (Standard Deviations) of Labor Market Outcomes, and Gender Variables
Employment-to- Population 
Ratio
Labor Force Participation 
Rate (LFPR)
Unemployment Fertility
0.672 (0.087) 0.726 (0.088) 0.075 (0.015) 1.679 (0.174) 0.271 (0.129)
Wage Gap
0.586 (0.094) 0.619 (0.101) 0.052 (0.015) 1.969 (0.295) 0.170 (0.026)
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There are also significant cross-country differences in the extent of labor market 
regulation, socio-demographics, and labor market activity, as charted in Tables 2a and 2b. 
Beginning with the outcome indicators in Table 2a, although the observed changes in 
female labor force participation rates are consistent with the general worldwide trend (in-
creasing in all of the countries over the thirty-nine year period), participation rates vary 
sometimes quite considerably. Thus, at any point in time, Italy, and Spain have signifi-
cantly lower participation rates when compared with other countries, and especially the 
Nordic nations of Finland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Participation rates are one of 
the margins investigated in the present treatment because minimum wages, and other 
rigidities, may inhibit low productivity workers from actively seeking employment once 
unemployed. On the other hand, they may encourage the labor market entry of other such 
individuals (see, for example, Mincer, 1976).  
Employment-to-population ratios rose significantly in all countries other than 
Sweden and Finland, where the observed changes were modest. Although employment 
rates do vary markedly across countries – from just 40.3 percent in Spain to 80.6 percent 
in Sweden – it is unemployment rates that show the greatest variance over the sample 
period. Even if by the early 2000s unemployment rates were close to their 1980 values, 
most European countries experienced very high unemployment in the intervening years. 
And the female unemployment rate actually rose from 1.7 percent in 1970 to 6.6 percent 
in 2009.  
In general, fertility rates declined significantly over the sample period; the excep-
tions being Norway, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden. In the 1980s the 
fertility rate averaged 2.5 children per woman cross all OECD countries. By 2004 this 
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average had declined to 1.8 children (and was even as low as 1.6 children during the late 
1990s). Child birth is the main reason for interruptions in a woman‟s work life and caring 
for young children either keeps women off the market or directs them to careers that 
permit flexibility to balance work and family. Such interruptions and career choices 
imply lower wages for women vis-à-vis men of the same age and education.  
The wage gap given in the last column of Table 2a is the difference between 
median male and female wages expressed as a percentage of the median male wage. As 
noted earlier, this variable was included to capture the existence of gender differences in 
occupational choice and education that might be expected to affect the bite of minimum 
wages in the case of females. Historically, females have had lower rates of labor market 
attachment and have tended to concentrate in lower-paying occupations, both of which 
tendencies make them susceptible to minimum wage-induced disemployment. As can be 
seen from the table, the wage gap averaged 22.5 percent over the period, ranging from 
12.2 percent in Belgium to 37.9 percent in Japan. 
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Country
Labor Standards 
Index
Employment Protection Active Labor Market Policies Union Density
Unemployment Insurance 
Replacement Rate
Australia 3 0.335 (0.048) 5.685 (0.667) 5.468 (9.443) 23.12 (3.368)
Belgium 2 0.955 (0.159) 15.04 (1.924) 12.87 (23.23) 42.45 (2.556)
Canada 1 0.270 (0.000) 6.026 (0.369) 7.381 (13.21) 17.58 (2.339)
Denmark 2 0.655 (0.146) 24.58 (6.306) 25.96 (34.85) 50.11 (8.053)
Finland 3 0.733 (0.043) 15.41 (5.129) 17.99 (32.49) 30.98 (7.488)
France 3 0.929 (0.105) 10.04 (1.480) 2.318 (4.070) 33.82 (6.257)
Germany 4 0.970 (0.128) 18.76 (4.020) 5.370 (9.493) 28.45 (1.101)
Ireland 2 0.297 (0.052) 16.34 (6.526) 13.48 (17.99) 29.09 (6.312)
Italy 3 1.049 (0.235) 11.11 (0.533) 7.949 (14.14) 13.19 (14.45)
Japan 1 0.677 (0.049) 4.787 (1.120) 4.683 (8.306) 9.988 (1.793)
The Netherlands 4 0.845 (0.090) 30.64 (12.36) 5.197 (9.212) 51.32 (2.803)
New Zealand 3 0.350 (0.088) 11.69 (2.849) 5.249 (9.226) 29.01 (1.814)
Spain 3 1.184 (0.141) 4.105 (1.222) 3.241 (5.853) 30.17 (8.196)
Sweden 5 0.889 (0.268) 48.72 (19.13) 18.19 (32.66) 23.86 (6.379)
United Kingdom 0 0.202 (0.022) 7.582 (1.484) 7.155 (12.56) 19.86 (3.361)
United States 0 0.070 (0.000) 3.587 (0.349) 2.949 (5.170) 12.86 (1.301)
Total 2.434 (1.370) 0.651 (0.359) 14.63 (13.15) 9.090 (19.02) 27.87 (13.32)
correlation with the lagged 
minimum wage measure
0.658 -0.119 0.436 0.031 0.711
Table 2b. Means (Standard Deviations) of Labor Market Structural Variables
Sources: The labor standards index is as described by Neumark and Wascher (2004: 237). It refers to the situation as of 1993 and is taken from the OECD Jobs Study (1994) and
specifically excludes the contributions of minimum wages and employment protection policies. The employment protection variable is taken from Nickell (2006) and is the
employment protection legislation data from the OECD.Stat using Version 1of that indicator: the strictness of employment protection legislation. Nickell (2006) extends this data
using Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). These data are available only until 2004, with 2004 values being used for later years. The union density measure is again taken from Nickell
(2006) and is calculated as union membership divided by employment, using administrative and survey data from the OECD labor market statistics data base. This base measure is
then extended by splicing in data from Visser (2006). These data are available only until 2004, with 2004 values being used for later years. The unemployment insurance replacement
rate is the original benefit replacement rate data published by the OECD. These data are also available only until 2004, with 2004 values again being used for later years. The active
labor market policies variable is taken from Nickell (2006). It is calculated as expenditures divided by the unemployment rate. These data are available only until 2004; missing values
are now interpolated using unemployment and GDP measures. All variables are standardized for the regressions.
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Finally, there are striking differences in the labor market conditions and institu-
tions of countries in the data, which can potentially shape the manner and the intensity 
with which minimum wages affect the outcome indicators. Thus, for example, one can 
readily envisage how any (dis)employment effects of minimum wages might be ampli-
fied by other labor market rigidities, such as national restrictions on hours adjustment or 
the use of flexible contracts. However, if there are also institutions in place that help the 
unemployed locate jobs, the frictions resulting from the impedimenta of minimum wage 
changes may be considerably attenuated. For these reasons, as noted earlier, we include 
in the model measures of labor standards, of the strictness of employment protection 
laws, of the extent of active labor market policies, of the generosity of UI replacement 
rates, and of the degree of unionization rates. Table 2b provides the descriptive statistics.  
 
5. Findings 
5.1 Basic Regression Results 
Our initial cet. par. results are provided in Table 3 for the adult female employ-
ment-to- population ratio and the adult female labor force participation rate, although we 
shall focus on the former. (Results for the adult female unemployment rate are remitted to 
Appendix Table 3.) Each of the OLS results given in the first three columns of the table 
excludes country fixed effects. The results in the first column include our wage gap and 
fertility arguments but no country-specific trend and year fixed effects. This specification 
reveals a well-determined negative association between the minimum wage argument and 
female employment and the expected negative coefficient estimate for the general labor 
demand measure, namely the adult male unemployment rate. For their part, and less and 
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more obviously perhaps, the coefficients for the wage gap and fertility are also negative, 
but their interaction terms are both positive. The implication is that the net effect of the 
wage gap (fertility rates) on employment is negative if the ratio of the minimum wage to 
the media wage is less than 2.29 (0.34). But as a practical matter, the diagnostics at the 
foot of the table indicate that we can reject the restriction that the year and country con-
trols and time trends are excludable.  
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0.704*** 0.681***
[0.070] [0.072]
0.708 0.699***
[0.000] [0.075]
-0.306*** -0.477*** -0.279*** -0.139 -0.114*** -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.328*** -0.313*** -0.485*** -0.134 -0.109** -0.037 -0.035**
[0.063] [0.088] [0.067] [0.088] [0.034] [0.022] [0.020] [0.067] [0.067] [0.095] [0.078] [0.041] [0.000] [0.017]
-0.614*** -0.966*** -0.588*** -0.645** -0.622*** -0.355*** -0.367*** 0.085 -0.125 -0.481** -0.182 -0.183 -0.101 -0.111*
[0.204] [0.186] [0.182] [0.134] [0.122] [0.052] [0.049] [0.201] [0.185] [0.189] [0.162] [0.152] [0.000] [0.059]
-0.096*** -0.02 0.071*** 0.017** -0.085*** -0.025 0.071*** 0.013
[0.020] [0.022] [0.016] [0.009] [0.021] [0.022] [0.018] [0.009]
-0.202*** -0.579*** 0.012 0.009 -0.196*** -0.665*** 0.007 -0.001
[0.046] [0.093] [0.032] [0.016] [0.045] [0.097] [0.037] [0.017]
Lagged Minimum-to-Median Wage Ratio interacted with:
Wage Gap 0.042 -0.064 -0.160*** -0.035* 0.001 -0.059 -0.158*** -0.030*
[0.049] [0.054] [0.034] [0.018] [0.053] [0.054] [0.041] [0.017]
Fertility Rate 0.586*** 1.325*** 0.042 -0.016 0.526*** 1.432*** -0.002 -0.013
[0.095] [0.173] [0.076] [0.040] [0.096] [0.186] [0.090] [0.040]
Constant 0.843*** 0.640*** 0.681*** 0.454*** 0.416*** 0.165*** 0.167*** 0.853*** 0.696*** 0.692*** 0.455*** 0.431*** 0.146 0.151***
[0.026] [0.039] [0.035] [0.046] [0.022] [0.024] [0.025] [0.027] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.026] [0.000] [0.024]
-0.394*** -0.463** -0.279*** -0.139 -0.106* -0.063*** -0.056*** -0.403*** -0.513** -0.485*** -0.134 -0.095 -0.037 -0.030***
[0.096] [0.222] [0.067] [0.088] [0.065] [0.022] [0.014] [0.086] [0.239] [0.095] [0.078] [0.063] [0.000] [0.012]
Country Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Specific Time Trends NO YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 339 339 339 339 339 307 307 339 339 339 339 339 307 307
R-squared 0.527 0.889 0.847 0.982 0.985 0.514 0.882 0.834 0.983 0.985
Number of Countries 16 16 14 14 16 16 14 14
Hausman / Sargan tests (p-values) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
Notes :Hubert-White robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. The STATA xtreg command reports a constant for the fixed effects regressions: It is the mean of all country-specific effects. The
Hausman specification test is for the exclusion of year and country controls and time trends in the first specification, for the exclusion of the country fixed effect in the second specification, and for the
exclusion of the wage gap and fertility variables and their minimum wage measure interactions in the third, fourth and sixth specification for each outcome variable. We also use the Hausman test to determine
whether the assumption of no correlation between the error terms and the independent variables is correct.  As this restriction is rejected in all specifications, we only report the fixed effects regression 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, *** at the .01 level.
FE GMM FE GMM
Lagged Adult Female LFPR
Lagged Min-to-Median Wage Ratio 
Adult Male Unemployment Rate
Wage Gap
Variable
Fertility Rate
Minimum Wage Elasticity
Table 3.  Estimates of the Standard Minimum Wage Model Using International Data
Adult Female Employment-to-Population Ratio Adult Female Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR)
OLS OLS
Lagged Adult Female Employment
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Turning therefore to the results in the second column of the table, the coefficient 
estimate for the minimum wage variable is somewhat higher in absolute terms than 
before. The same is true of the other coefficients with the exception of the wage gap. 
Moreover, the wage gap-minimum wage interaction term is now also negative – as is to 
be expected if the wage gap is an inverse measure of the skill level of the female work-
force with a greater wage gap implying an  increased bite of the minimum wage – sug-
gesting that wage gap effects are reinforcing in reducing female employment. As before, 
higher fertility is associated with reduced employment but the interaction term is positive. 
In this case, the net effect of higher fertility rates on female employment is negative if the 
minimum-to-median wage ratio is less than 0.44. The estimated minimum wage elastic-
ity, computed as the coefficient on the minimum wage variable plus each of the coeffi-
cients on the interaction terms multiplied by the standardized values of the corresponding 
covariates, indicates that a 10 percent increase in the lagged minimum wage variables 
minimum wage gap variable is associated with a 4.6 percent fall in female employment, 
which is of course a high value for developed nations. But again the bottom line diagnos-
tic is that the exclusion restriction (here an absence of country fixed effects) is again 
contraindicated.  
In the third column of the table, we report results from dropping the fertility and 
wage gap variables on the grounds of their potential endogeneity. For example, if mini-
mum wage hikes narrow the wage gap, this should lead to an understatement of the effect 
of minimum wages on employment in equations containing both arguments (see, in par-
ticular, Blau and Kahn, 2003, on the effect of wage floors on female relative wages). 
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Observe however that in this specification excluding both arguments reduces rather than 
increases the absolute magnitude of the lagged minimum wage coefficient. 
Given the indication that country effects are important, what are the consequences 
of controlling for country fixed effects as well as year fixed effects and country specific 
time trends? The results are given in the fifth column of Table 3.  The most obvious 
effect is of course a marked fall in the coefficient estimate for the minimum wage 
variable, indicating that a sizable part of the effect obtained earlier does, as expected, 
reflect country-specific factors. But the lagged minimum wage argument remains highly 
significant, even if the estimated minimum wage elasticity (of -0.106) on this occasion is 
only marginally statistically significant. The coefficient estimate for the demand argu-
ment (the adult male unemployment rate) remains highly significant albeit reduced in 
absolute magnitude. Interestingly, the own effect of the wage gap variable effect is now 
positive and well determined, while its effect when interacted with lagged minimum 
wage is strongly negative. The implication is that the net effect of the wage gap on 
employment is negative if the minimum wage ratio exceeds 0.44. The own and interac-
tion effects of fertility are positive and reinforcing although neither coefficient estimate is 
statistically significant. On this occasion, the results of dropping the wage gap and 
fertility rate variables – shown in the fourth column of the table – are more modest than 
before.  That is, the absolute magnitude of the lagged minimum wage coefficient 
increases rather modestly in absolute magnitude. 
Our preferred estimates are given in the seventh column of the table for the 
dynamic employment model.  These GMM estimates do indicate a further diminution in 
the point estimate of the lagged minimum wage coefficient but both it and the minimum 
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wage elasticity are highly significant. The signs and significance levels of the coefficients 
of the other variables carry over from the fixed effects specification to the dynamic ver-
sion of the model, although each is reduced in absolute magnitude. Observe that that the 
inclusion of the lagged employment rate – which is highly significant – can also be inter-
preted as helping to distinguish between the short-run and long-run effects of the mini-
mum wage on employment. Given these estimates, -0.062 is the short-run coefficient and 
-0.194 (=-0.062/(1 – 0.681) is the long-run coefficient. The own and interaction effects of 
the wage gap and fertility arguments are of opposing sign and imply that the net effect of 
a greater wage gap on female employment is negative if the minimum-to-mean wage 
ratio exceeds 0.49, and that the net effect of higher fertility is negative if that ratio 
exceeds 0.56. Observe from the sixth column of the table that some understatement of the 
minimum wage effect is implied by the inclusion of the wage gap argument, but it is now 
only at the third decimal place.  
Before turning to the results for labor force participation contained in the remain-
ing columns of Table 3, we pause to take note of the effects of excluding all three Nordic 
countries from the sample and then reinstating them but with Skedinger‟s data in the form 
of four separate minimum-wage-to-median-wage series for the retail, hotel and restau-
rants, and food/bakery sectors and a cross-sector average measure (all the previous sec-
tors plus engineering and construction. The results are provided in Appendix Tables 1 
and 2, respectively. First, the exclusion of Denmark, Finland, and Sweden makes very 
little difference to the results reported earlier. That is, the pattern of the coefficients esti-
mates is broadly replicated and for our preferred GMM specification the point estimates 
are particularly close. Reinstating the Nordic countries but with the new data for Sweden 
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in Appendix Table 2 scarcely changes the picture. We conclude that our employment re-
sults reported thus far are essentially unchallenged  by data issues attendant on an 
understatement in part of the of the key minimum wage argument deployed in the pre-
vious literature and the present treatment. But we will need to see if the same applies 
when we estimate our augmented model.  
Turning therefore to the last seven columns of Table 3, we repeat each specifica-
tion used earlier but for a different outcome indicator: the adult female labor force 
participation rate. The bottom line of this exercise is that disemployment appears to have 
something of a counterpart in lowered female labor force participation. In all full regres-
sions, the coefficient estimate for the lagged minimum wage is negative and statistically 
significant. But few other arguments are statistically significant across specifications. For 
the fixed effect and GMM estimates, the net effect of a higher wage gap on participation 
is negative if the minimum wage ratio is greater than 0.45 or greater than 0.43, respec-
tively. The effects of the fertility rate are negative and reinforcing for the GMM specifi-
cation, although in the case of the fixed effect specification they would only become 
negative if the minimum wage were to equal three and one-half times the median wage! 
Excluding the minimum wage in all cases raises the coefficient estimate for the lagged 
minimum wage, but in our preferred GMM specification any implied understatement of 
the minimum wage effect would appear inconsequential. 
Finally, results for adult female unemployment are provided in Appendix Table 3 
and generally offer some suggestion that minimum wage increases feed into higher 
female employment. Thus, an adverse minimum wage effect is clearly discernible for our 
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preferred specification, where again inclusion of the wage gap argument seemingly pro-
vides little understatement of any minimum wage effect.  
5.2 The Augmented Model 
 We now examine whether the employment effects of the minimum wage are 
influenced by differences in minimum wage systems across countries and by the presence 
of diverse labor market policies or institutions. As far as the minimum wage is concerned, 
we consider the method used to set minimum wages (whether it was bargained, as 
opposed to being statutorily determined), whether provision is made for a youth submi-
nimum, and the presence of subnational minima (i.e. wage floors that vary across 
regions/industries). At the same time – rather than sequentially as in Neumark and 
Wascher – we also examine the role of more encompassing employment protection, 
higher labor standards, and greater union density, as well as more generous UI systems 
and more comprehensive active labor market policies. Observe that, with the two excep-
tions noted earlier, all of these variables are time varying rather than fixed as in Neumark 
and Wascher.
14 
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 Since it might be objected that our gender controls are thin, as part of our augmentation strategy we also 
experimented with a parental leave variable, measured as weeks of entitlement and constructed combining 
information from Ruhm and Teague (1997) and Ruhm (1998) with OECD data. Parental leave may 
stimulate the employment and participation rates of women – while lowering their unemployment – by 
increasing their stability in the firm and also by encouraging them to qualify for leave benefits. On the other 
hand, increases in the cost of employing eligible women might lead employers to discriminate against them 
in employment, particularly if minimum wage hikes make it less possible for women to „pay‟ for their 
leave. In the event, our parental leave measure was strongly and negatively correlated with the wage gap 
argument in each country, while its inclusion in the fitted model was formally contraindicated. Problems 
associated with the sparse formal representation of „gender and the labor market‟ in this study are of course 
mitigated by the use of country fixed effects.  
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Lagged Adult Female Employment 0.618*** 0.602***
[0.073] [0.072]
Lagged Adult Female LFPR 0.672*** 0.660***
[0.063] [0.063]
Lagged Min to Median Wage Ratio -1.655*** -1.454*** -0.477*** -0.394*** -0.312*** -0.304*** -1.760*** -1.525*** -0.480*** -0.432** -0.210** -0.237**
[0.275] [0.199] [0.122] [0.133] [0.058] [0.058] [0.304] [0.210] [0.112] [0.136] [0.069] [0.061]
Adult Male Unemployment Rate -1.014*** -0.857*** -0.558*** -0.543*** -0.370*** -0.377*** -0.549*** -0.413*** -0.161 -0.163 -0.113 -0.123*
[0.133] [0.126] [0.111] [0.102] [0.050] [0.048] [0.120] [0.116] [0.158] [0.147] [0.069] [0.069]
Wage Gap 0.041 0.057** 0.030** 0.078** 0.076** 0.026*
[0.032] [0.022] [0.012] [0.032] [0.033] [0.015]
Fertility Rate -0.194*** -0.055 -0.039** -0.235*** -0.038 -0.033*
[0.053] [0.044] [0.015] [0.054] [0.038] [0.017]
Bargained Minimum Wage 0.318*** 0.265*** 0.018 0.032 0.225** 0.225*** 0.03 0.04
[0.083] [0.083] [0.065] [0.065] [0.087] [0.084] [0.062] [0.072]
Youth Subminimum -0.849*** -0.623*** -0.878*** -0.630***
[0.145] [0.117] [0.152] [0.119]
Subnational Minimum -0.509*** -0.463*** -0.429*** -0.431***
[0.146] [0.118] [0.161] [0.122]
Employment Protection  Index -0.159*** -0.181*** -0.041 -0.068 -0.03 -0.052** -0.155*** -0.177*** -0.038 -0.062 -0.024 -0.046**
[0.031] [0.030] [0.044] [0.055] [0.021] [0.026] [0.031] [0.029] [0.058] [0.067] [0.020] [0.022]
Union Density 0.079*** 0.003 -0.039 -0.025 -0.009 -0.008 0.108*** 0.032 -0.004 0.005 0.002 -0.002
[0.028] [0.031] [0.025] [0.022] [0.010] [0.008] [0.029] [0.028] [0.018] [0.022] [0.011] [0.012]
Unemp. Insurance Replacement Rate -0.120*** -0.074** -0.093* -0.100*** -0.081*** -0.098*** -0.047 -0.021 -0.043 -0.044 -0.056*** -0.065***
[0.044] [0.037] [0.046] [0.040] [0.022] [0.022] [0.044] [0.037] [0.052] [0.041] [0.018] [0.019]
Active Labor Market Policies 0.073*** 0.051** 0.014 0.006 -0.013 -0.013 0.062** 0.035 -0.003 -0.012 -0.014 -0.013
[0.027] [0.024] [0.019] [0.019] [0.012] [0.012] [0.028] [0.024] [0.018] [0.020] [0.016] [0.015]
Labor Standards Index 0.266*** 0.258*** 0.322*** 0.318***
[0.057] [0.051] [0.064] [0.050]
Adult Female Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) 
Variable
GMMFEOLS
Table 4.  Estimates of the Augmented Minimum Wage Model with Characteristics of Minimum Wage Systems and Other Labor Market  Policies and Institutions for the 
Emloyment and Labor Force Participation Outcomes
continues on the next page
GMMFEOLS
Adult Female Employment-to-Population Ratio
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Wage Gap -0.211*** -0.126*** -0.060** -0.290*** -0.174** -0.058*
[0.065] [0.052] [0.028] [0.067] [0.077] [0.033]
Fertility Rate 0.391*** 0.120 0.055 0.409*** 0.055 0.031
[0.113] [0.115] [0.039] [0.114] [0.102] [0.040]
Bargained Minimum Wage -0.518*** -0.534*** -0.481** -0.575*** -0.373*** -0.431*** -0.355* -0.431*** -0.335* -0.469** -0.226* -0.304**
[0.174] [0.156] [0.192] [0.200] [0.123] [0.138] [0.185] [0.161] [0.176] [0.213] [0.127] [0.152]
Youth Subminimum 1.629*** 1.200*** 0.484** 0.370* 0.291*** 0.280*** 1.720*** 1.207*** 0.472** 0.363* 0.202*** 0.228***
[0.298] [0.230] [0.198] [0.175] [0.077] [0.080] [0.317] [0.237] [0.176] [0.197] [0.078] [0.077]
Subnational Minimum 1.215*** 1.220*** 0.458** 0.516** 0.323*** 0.401*** 1.088*** 1.140*** 0.258 0.365** 0.165** 0.258***
[0.298] [0.223] [0.213] [0.188] [0.077] [0.069] [0.329] [0.233] [0.185] [0.156] [0.080] [0.067]
Employment Protection Index 0.220*** 0.240*** 0.08 0.134 0.057 0.098** 0.239*** 0.237*** 0.077 0.115 0.048 0.085**
[0.059] [0.059] [0.081] [0.104] [0.037] [0.047] [0.059] [0.059] [0.114] [0.131] [0.037] [0.041]
Union Density -0.154*** -0.028 0.059 0.037 0.001 0.002 -0.194*** -0.069 0.001 -0.013 -0.012 -0.004
[0.051] [0.054] [0.045] [0.036] [0.019] [0.016] [0.053] [0.051] [0.039] [0.042] [0.023] [0.024]
Unemp.Insurance Replacement Rate 0.060 0.070 0.147 0.156* 0.150*** 0.179*** -0.05 0.001 0.089 0.09 0.120*** 0.137***
[0.084] [0.069] [0.087] [0.075] [0.044] [0.042] [0.086] [0.070] [0.094] [0.073] [0.043] [0.043]
Active Labor Market Policies -0.125** -0.076* -0.013 0.003 0.031 0.032 -0.109** -0.047 0.015 0.033 0.029 0.03
[0.050] [0.044] [0.035] [0.037] [0.025] [0.025] [0.054] [0.044] [0.034] [0.039] [0.033] [0.031]
Labor Standards Index -0.384*** -0.388*** -0.031 -0.09 -0.117* -0.160** -0.529*** -0.531*** -0.136 -0.193 -0.135* -0.176**
[0.101] [0.091] [0.114] [0.115] [0.062] [0.062] [0.112] [0.089] [0.136] [0.142] [0.071] [0.073]
Constant 1.113*** 1.080*** 0.394*** 0.377*** 0.164*** 0.154** 1.179*** 1.154*** 0.435** 0.434*** 0.141*** 0.144***
[0.115] [0.085] [0.037] [0.048] [0.049] [0.060] [0.127] [0.090] [0.045] [0.050] [0.043] [0.053]
Minimum Wage Elasticity -1.016*** -0.981*** -0.319*** -0.268*** -0.207*** -0.194*** -1.096*** -1.039*** -0.338*** -0.303*** -0.139** -0.149***
[0.267] [0.202] [0.119] [0.107] [0.089] [0.092] [0.309] [0.245] [0.102] [0.095] [0.071] [0.076]
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES YES NO NO YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Specific Time Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 339 339 339 339 307 307 339 339 339 339 307 307
R-squared 0.959 0.972 0.988 0.989 0.953 0.971 0.985 0.987
Number of Countries 16 16 14 14 16 16 14 14
Hausman / Sargan tests (p-values) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
*Statistically significant at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, *** at the .01 level.
Lagged Minimum to Median Wage Ratio interacted with: continues from the previous page
Notes: See Notes to Table 3. All minimum wage setting institution dummies are time invariant in all countries except for the subnational minimum wage dummy and the negotiated minimum
wage dummy for Britain. Thus, in columns (2) and (4) the coefficient for negotiated minimum wage dummy is identified only with British data. We do not estimate a coefficient for the
negotiated minimum wage dummy because this variable is dropped due to collinearity. 
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 Results for the augmented model are given in Table 4. The OLS results for 
employment shown in the second column of the table suggest that bargained minimum 
wages (as opposed to statutorily-determined minima) have an ambiguous effect on 
female employment. Although the own effect of a bargained minimum is positive, the 
interaction term is negative, such that the net effect on employment is negative as long as 
the ratio of the minimum wage to the median wage is greater than 0.50. Whatever the 
benefits of the flexibility introduced by bargained minimum wage systems for other 
groups of workers, then, the results for females are mixed. For its part the net effect of 
subnational minima at industry or regional level is negative of the minimum wage ration 
is less than 0.38. And although the own effect of a youth subminimum is negative the 
interaction term is positive such that the presence of a youth minimum is on net 
associated with lower female employment rates where the minimum wage ratio is less 
than 0.52. One possibility here is that the youth „discount‟ is lower the higher the mini-
mum wage. As far as the other institutions are concerned, the own effect of more 
generous employment protection and higher UI replacement rates is negative while that 
of active labor market policies and labor standards is positive. But in each case the asso-
ciated interaction terms are opposite in sign such that the net effects of employment pro-
tection  (unemployment insurance) are negative if the minimum wage ratio is less than 
0.75 (1.06, which is of course always the case). As far as active labor market policies 
(labor standards) is concerned, the net effect is negative if the minimum wage ratio 
exceeds 0.67 (0.66)  The union coefficients while insignificant imply that higher union 
density has a negative effect when the minimum wage ratio is greater than 0.11 which is 
always the case in our data.  Finally, with respect to the fertility rate and wage gap 
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measures, it is the case that higher fertility rates depress female employment on net where 
the minimum wage ratio is less than 0.50 while the net impact of the wage gap is always 
negative since the minimum wage ratio always exceeds the tipping point of 0.19 in our 
data. When we omit the wage gap and fertility variables on account of their potential 
endogeneity (see the first column of Table 4) the pattern and significance of the other 
coefficient estimates is largely unaffected and the expected increase in the coefficient 
estimate of the lagged minimum wage is but modest. Similarly, the absolute value of the 
minimum wage elasticity is little affected.  We therefore have greater confidence in the 
use of both variables. More generally and as before, we can reject the exclusion of coun-
try effects in this specification.  
Fixed effects and our preferred GMM estimates are contained in the fourth and 
sixth columns of Table 4, prefaced in each case by a specification that exclude the wage 
gap and fertility rate arguments.  Beginning with the fixed effects results, the strongly 
negative effect of the lagged minimum wage on employment is again reported although it 
is smaller in absolute value than in the OLS estimates (but larger than reported in Table 
3). The own effects of employment protection, union density, and the UI replacement rate 
are all negative but with the exception of the latter not statistically significant, while the 
directional influence of the basic variables is again confirmed. (Note that little reliance 
can be placed on the dummy bargained minimum wage variable in the fixed effects speci-
fication since it is solely identified by the British innovation, and is necessarily unidenti-
fied in the GMM estimation. Note too that the labor standards index drops out as it is 
time invariant measure.)   
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The interactions of the minimum wage argument with the wage gap, fertility, and 
the labor market institutions/policies are also of interest and – abstracting from youth 
subminima and subnational minima and labor standards – are opposite in sign from the 
own effects (with the exception of active labor market policies that are always favorable). 
The wage gap has a negative effect on net if the minimum ratio is greater than 0.45, while 
that of fertility is negative once that ratio falls below 0.46. The effect on female employ-
ment of a bargained minimum wage is always negative since the tipping-point value for 
the minimum wage rate of 0.06 is always exceeded in our data. Employment protection 
has a negative influence on net as long as the minimum wage ratio is less than 0.51, un-
employment insurance has a negative effect where the wage ratio is less than 0.64, and 
union density where the ratio is less than 0.68. As before, excluding the wage gap and 
fertility variables (see the third column of Table 4) leaves the pattern of coefficient 
estimates unaffected. The coefficient estimate on the key lagged minimum wage variable 
increases in absolute value but the change is insufficient for us to downplay the hypothe-
sized role of the wage gap and fertility arguments.  
Our preferred GMM estimates in the sixth column of the table are even sharper. 
Thus, the own effect of higher fertility rates is now statistically significant as is the nega-
tive own effect of employment protection. Also the interaction terms are generally better 
determined. Cases in point include employment protection, youth and national submi-
nima, and labor standards. The effect of higher labor standards and union density are 
always negative on net, though the latter coefficient estimates are not statistically signifi-
cant. Positive interaction effects for fertility, employment protection, unemployment 
insurance, and active labor market policies are nevertheless consistent with negative 
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employment effects on net if the minimum wage ratio is less than 0.71, 0.53, 0.55, and 
0.41 respectively. Much as before the positive own wage effect associated with the wage 
gap argument is consistent with a negative net effect once the minimum wage exceeds 
0.50.  The seeming detriment of a bargained minimum wage is underscored (see Bertola 
et al., 2007), even if the presence of different wage floors by industry and region seems to 
reduce the sting of minimum wages.  Excluding the wage gap and fertility arguments (in 
the fifth column) leaves the key lagged minimum wage coefficient virtually unaffected as 
well as the minimum wage elasticity. Finally, we see that the latter is considerably larger 
in absolute terms than earlier reported for the more parsimonious regression in Table 3 
that contains no information on the minimum wage fixing machinery and other labor 
market institutions. 
In Appendix Tables 4 and 5 we provide employment results for the sample less 
the Nordic group and for a sample including the Nordic countries but with revised data 
for Sweden, respectively. Other than for the OLS results, it is clear than removing the 
Nordic group entirely produces only modest changes. For the fixed effect estimates the 
new coefficient estimates are somewhat smaller in absolute terms – including the key 
lagged minimum wage coefficient which is also less precisely estimated than before – but 
there are no changes in sign and significant variables generally remain so. More impor-
tantly, the GMM results are closer still in all respects, including the magnitude of the key 
lagged minimum wage regressor. As for the estimates with revised data for Sweden 
shown in Appendix Table 5, the results are again very close. Focusing on just the GMM 
results for the average minimum-to-median wage ratio, there is close correspondence 
between the point estimates of the lagged minimum wage variable and the minimum 
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wage elasticities with their counterparts in Table 4. Although there are no changes in sign 
for this sample, the employment protection and fertility arguments (and the interaction of 
the former with the minimum wage ratio) are not statistically significant. The labor stan-
dards interaction term is likewise statistically insignificant. That said, the two sets of 
estimates for this preferred specification are again very close, so that there does not 
appear to be a material data issue here. 
 Returning to results for the main sample, the last seven columns of Table 4 
present results for labor force participation. It is striking that the impact of minimum 
wages on this outcome indicator is much more pronounced than in the parsimonious 
model of Table 3. The lagged minimum wage term is now considerably stronger and 
better determined than before and the minimum wage participation elasticities correspon-
dingly greater in absolute terms. The results therefore also more closely parallel the 
results for employment. Focusing on the GMM results in the final column of the table, 
we see that in conjunction with the minimum wage argument the wage gap, bargained 
minima and labor standards have a negative effect on participation rates (the tipping point 
for the first argument is 0.45). For their part, the interaction effects of youth subminima 
and subnational minima are both positive. And although the interaction effects of 
employment protection, unemployment insurance, and active labor market policies are 
positive, the net effect of these variables on participation is negative if the wage ratio is 
greater than 0.54, 0.47, and 0.04, respectively. The own and interaction effects of unions 
are negative and hence reinforcing although neither coefficient estimate is statistically 
significant. 
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Finally, results for unemployment are given in Appendix Table 6. For the pre-
ferred GMM measure, the lagged minimum wage argument is weakly significant but few 
other arguments achieve significance. Those that do are quite consistent (i.e. opposite in 
sign) with the employment results. Cases in point include the positively signed coeffi-
cient estimates for the adult male unemployment rate, employment protection, and the 
unemployment insurance replacement rate variables, and the bargained minimum wage 
term, and the negative coefficient estimate for the subnational minimum wage. Excluding 
the wage gap and fertility rate arguments on grounds of their potential endogeneity 
inflates the point estimate for lagged minimum wages more substantially than for the 
other outcome indicators but does not greatly affect the other coefficient estimates. The 
more important bottom line, however, would be that the unemployment results are 
altogether less coherent than the employment findings. The reason is to be found in the 
(improved) participation rate findings.   
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Country
Australia -0.231 *** (0.017) -0.184 *** (0.015) 0.052 *** (0.003)
Belgium -0.191 *** (0.021) -0.104 *** (0.022) 0.111 *** (0.008)
Canada -0.185 *** (0.017) -0.145 *** (0.018) 0.048 *** (0.002)
France -0.223 *** (0.071) -0.174 *** (0.059) 0.049 *** (0.013)
Germany -0.380 *** (0.013) -0.329 *** (0.013) 0.094 *** (0.003)
Ireland -0.050 *** (0.021) -0.024 (0.018) 0.032 *** (0.004)
Italy -0.515 *** (0.032) -0.404 *** (0.025) 0.117 *** (0.004)
Japan -0.240 *** (0.004) -0.188 *** (0.003) 0.047 *** (0.002)
The Netherlands -0.043 *** (0.018) -0.050 *** (0.013) -0.003 (0.009)
New Zealand -0.188 *** (0.026) -0.149 *** (0.022) 0.043 *** (0.008)
Spain -0.142 *** (0.016) -0.107 *** (0.014) 0.023 *** (0.004)
Sweden -0.180 *** (0.051) -0.175 *** (0.043) 0.018 (0.015)
United Kingdom -0.186 *** (0.016) -0.108 *** (0.018) 0.085 *** (0.017)
United States -0.194 *** (0.012) -0.142 *** (0.010) 0.059 *** (0.002)
*Statistically significant at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, *** at the .01 level.
Table 5. Minimum Wage Elasticity of Labor Market Indicators
Average Minimum Wage Elasticity (Standard Deviation)
Employment
  Labor Force Participation   
Rate (LFPR) 
         Unemployment
Notes: The minimum wage effects for each country are based on the indicated specifications in columns (3), (6) of Table
4 and column (3) of Appendix Table 6. Employment, participation and unemployment elasticities are computed for each
year as the coefficient on the minimum wage variable plus each of the coefficients on the interaction terms multiplied by
the minimum wage setting dummies and the standardized values of the fertility rate, wage gap, and policy variables for
each country. Averages of these elasticities across years are then calculated. Values for Finland and Denmark are not in
this table since they are not included in the GMM regression due to lack of sufficient observations.
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 As a final exercise, we investigate differences in minimum wage effects across 
countries. First, the individual country minimum wage elasticities are reported in Table 5. 
The estimates in question are based on the GMM specifications given in the sixth and 
twelfth columns of Table 4 (and the sixth column of Appendix Table 6 in the case of the 
unemployment outcome indicator) are averages of the annual values for each country.
15
 
We also calculated individual country minimum wage elasticities without controls for the 
wage gap and fertility, and without the Nordic countries (just Sweden in this case) and 
with separate minimum wage ratios for Sweden. The results generally follow the pattern 
of Table 5 and are available from the authors upon request.    
 The minimum wage elasticities with respect to employment range from -0.043 in 
the case of The Netherlands to -0.515 for Italy. The corresponding range for the mini-
mum wage participation elasticity – which with the exception of one country exceed the 
former elasticities in absolute terms – range from -0.024 (for Ireland) to -0.404 (Italy). 
These results imply material disemployment effects. But the effects of minimum wages 
on this labor market segment are not confined to employment and participation. As 
shown in the final column of the table, minimum wage unemployment elasticities are 
(with one exception) also positive and in almost all cases statistically significant as well. 
To be sure, these latter elasticities are smaller, but the shake out of female labor from 
higher minimum wages evidently also feeds through into unemployment.  
 
                                                 
15
 We also estimated the corresponding minimum wage elasticities for the fixed effect specifications given 
in the fourth, and tenth columns of Table 4 (and the fourth column of Appendix Table 6). In each case the 
elasticities were somewhat larger, and all were well determined. The results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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Canada e_emp -0.185 United Kingdom e_emp -0.186 Belgium e_emp -0.191
(13,14) e_unemp 0.048  (15, 14) e_unemp 0.085  (10,4) e_unemp 0.111
e_lfpr -0.145 e_lfpr -0.108 e_lfpr -0.104
Ireland e_emp -0.050 United States e_emp -0.194
(10,10) e_unemp 0.032  (15,16) e_unemp 0.059
e_lfpr -0.024 e_lfpr -0.142
Japan e_emp -0.240
(13,12) e_unemp 0.047
e_lfpr -0.188
Australia e_emp -0.231 Sweden e_emp -0.180 Italy e_emp -0.515
(4,13) e_unemp 0.052 (1,1) e_unemp 0.018 (4,4) e_unemp 0.117
e_lfpr -0.184 e_lfpr -0.175 e_lfpr -0.404
New Zealand e_emp -0.188 France e_emp -0.223 The Netherlands e_emp -0.043
(4,11) e_unemp 0.043 (4,7) e_unemp 0.049  (2,3) e_unemp -0.003
e_lfpr -0.149 e_lfpr -0.174 e_lfpr -0.050
Spain e_emp -0.142 Germany e_emp -0.380
(4, 9) e_unemp 0.023 (2,1) e_unemp 0.094
e_lfpr -0.107 e_lfpr -0.329
Table 6.  Elasticities across Labor Market Characteristics
low employment protection/low active labor market policies high employment protection/high active labor market policies
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Notes: Joint rankings are created as the ranking of the sum of employment protection and active labor market policy rankings. The first ranking in parenthesis is for labor standards
and the second ranking is for this joint measure. These ranking are based on average policy values for each country, not the yearly values. Values for Finland and Denmark are
missing because they are not included in GMM regression due to lack of sufficient observations.
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e_emp -0.144 -0.207 -0.224
e_unemp 0.051 0.061 0.051
e_lfpr -0.096 -0.154 -0.177
e_emp -0.127 -0.193 -0.191 -0.227
e_unemp 0.048 0.059 0.043 0.052
e_lfpr -0.083 -0.140 -0.152 -0.185
e_emp -0.191 -0.240 -0.197 -0.181
e_unemp 0.111 0.046 0.039 0.034
e_lfpr -0.104 -0.188 -0.162 -0.160
e_emp -0.168 -0.342
e_unemp 0.025 0.071
e_lfpr -0.149 -0.275
Notes: In this table high and low classifications for each labor market policy or social characteristic is
based on yearly values, not a unique value for each country across years but unique to each country
and each year given the values for these characteristics. Thus, elasticities for one country for
different years can be averaged in different cells. Values for Finland and Denmark are missing because
they are not included in GMM regression due to lack of sufficient observations.
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Table 7 . Elasticities across Labor Market Policies and Social Characteristics
low labor standards high labor standards
low wage gap high wage gap low wage gap high wage gap
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The next issue concerns combinations of policies. As we have seen, Neumark and 
Wascher (2004: 242-3) were able to detect certain patterns in the data; most notable of 
which was their finding that the disemployment effects of minimum wages were strong-
est in those countries (Canada, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom) with 
the least regulated markets. In our framework of time-varying regressors, identification of 
individual countries with set regimes is not straightforward. We first followed Neumark 
and Wascher‟s methodology and grouped our countries with respect to degree of market 
regulation using an average value for the policy indicators and by creating a joint ranking 
for employment protection and active labor market policies. As is evident from Table 6, 
which includes unemployment elasticities in addition to employment and participation 
elasticities, we cannot replicate their results for prime-age females. Indeed, if anything, 
the suggestion is the least regulated markets produce the best outcomes for women.   
However, it is manifestly the case that the patterns are by no means consistent for 
all countries in these groups, pointing to the role of other factors in explaining the differ-
ences.  Moreover, with our time-varying regressors, countries move in their rankings over 
the years, making it hard to characterize countries as populating a unique cluster. In Table 
7, therefore, we allow each country to be classified by its yearly status by policy dimen-
sion.
16
 We can see from this table that in highly regulated countries, especially in 
circumstances where the wage gap is high (where women are less productive or concen-
trated in low-paying industries), and where fertility rates are also high (implying lesser 
job experience), minimum wages seem to have the highest collateral damage to female 
employment and participation. In short, policy parameters alone cannot explain elastici-
                                                 
16
 16. Observe that for both Tables 6 and 7 our country data conform to those used in Tables 3 and 4 (for 
employment and participation rates, respectively) and Appendix Table 6 (for unemployment rates) and, 
being based on the GMM estimates, exclude Finland and Denmark.  
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ties in a cohesive manner. Other country characteristics play a more crucial role in ex-
plaining female labor market activity.  
The bottom line is that despite the results of our regression analysis sharing a key 
commonality with the study of Neumark and Wascher, there is little evidence of similar 
patterns of elasticities in our data. This is not unexpected given the time-varying nature of 
our regressors and the different demographic group studied.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The present exercise is one of only a handful of studies to have investigated the 
sensitivity of female employment to the minimum wage, and almost the only one to 
exploit a cross-nation panel. Our study was motivated by Neumark and Wascher‟s 
seminal study of the sensitivity of teenage and youth unemployment to minimum wages, 
the innovation here residing in their analysis of a cross-country panel than the target 
group selected. In this regard, we were also struck by the authors‟ caveat that, by using 
the adult minimum wage in constructing the minimum wage ratio, they had “overstated 
the relevant (or „effective‟) minimum wage for the age groups under study ...” (Hence 
their use of a youth subminimum in their first set of extended regressions.). In our study, 
use of the adult minimum wage raises no such difficulties of interpretation; although our 
understanding of minimum wage effects is enhanced by the inclusion of a gender wage 
gap argument, offering insights into the bite of minimum wages even after taking the 
potential endogeneity of the variable into account. And indeed we found consistent 
evidence that increases in minimum wages translated into lower female employment and 
participation rates. The results for unemployment were somewhat less transparent, pre-
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sumably because of labor market withdrawal. On the other hand, we were frankly sur-
prised by the failure of the presence of youth subminima to strengthen the minimum 
wage effect, although one possibility might be that the youth discount may vary inversely 
with the magnitude of the minimum wage. Future research might usefully examine this 
relation and also whether the effect might reflect complementarities between youth and 
particular age groups within the female labor force. Another issue concerns the seemingly 
unfavorable effect of bargained wage minima. This might reflect a familiar union effect 
not otherwise really discernible in the union indicator deployed here.    
There were also some interesting commonalities between ourselves and Neumark 
and Wascher having to do with the interaction of labor standards and employment pro-
tection with minimum wages. That said, our data for adult females do not permit such a 
tidy configuration of nations as reported by Neumark and Wascher for youths and 
teenagers of both genders. We do not find any obvious alignment of labor market institu-
tions and policies. Indeed, the institutional patterns we detect are if anything the reverse 
of those reported by Neumark and Wascher. 
Yet the more fundamental agreement was the finding of consistent disemploy-
ment effects for the target group examined. Our preferred estimates of the elasticity of the 
adult female employment-to-population ratio with respect to the minimum wage ranged 
from -0.056 to -0.463 in the basic model and from -0.194 to -0.981 in the augmented 
model. These are not trivial values for developed nations. 
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Variable
OLS FE GMM
0.637***
[0.067]
-0.228*** -0.135*** -0.079***
[0.055] [0.032] [0.012]
-0.394*** -0.544*** -0.352***
[0.147] [0.103] [0.046]
-0.034** 0.070*** 0.020**
[0.017] [0.016] [0.009]
-0.395*** 0.015 0.012
[0.079] [0.039] [0.020]
Wage Gap 0.028 -0.150*** -0.039**
[0.039] [0.034] [0.020]
Fertility Rate 1.150*** 0.054 -0.012
[0.148] [0.096] [0.049]
Constant 0.515*** 0.397*** 0.180***
[0.031] [0.023] [0.024]
-0.398*** -0.132*** -0.074***
[0.189] [0.062] [0.016]
Country Fixed Effects NO YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Country Specific Time Trends YES YES YES
Observations 319 319 291
R-squared 0.919 0.987
Number of Countries 16 14
Hausman / Sargan tests (p-values) 0.000 0.000 -
Notes: See Notes for Table 3 in the main text.
Minimum Wage Elasticity
Adult Female Employment-to-Population Ratio
Lagged Adult Female Employment
Lagged Minimum-to-Median Wage Ratio interacted with:
Appendix Table 1.  Estimates of the Standard Minimum Wage Model Using International Data, Excluding Nordic Countries
*Statistically significant at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, *** at the .01 level.
Lagged Min-to-Median Wage Ratio 
Adult Male Unemployment Rate
Wage Gap
Fertility Rate
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OLS FE GMM OLS FE GMM OLS FE GMM OLS FE GMM
0.676*** 0.672*** 0.643*** 0.672***
[0.071] [0.069] [0.069] [0.068]
-0.151* -0.119*** -0.070*** -0.011 -0.146*** -0.078*** -0.072 -0.153*** -0.078*** -0.246*** -0.131*** -0.080***
[0.086] [0.033] [0.017] [0.094] [0.036] [0.015] [0.084] [0.046] [0.014] [0.090] [0.034] [0.015]
-0.667*** -0.627*** -0.371*** -0.660*** -0.615*** -0.367*** -0.644*** -0.611*** -0.357*** -0.658*** -0.624*** -0.367***
[0.194] [0.121] [0.051] [0.185] [0.119] [0.051] [0.189] [0.117] [0.048] [0.194] [0.121] [0.051]
0.093*** 0.073*** 0.018** 0.125*** 0.063*** 0.015** 0.111*** 0.062*** 0.021*** 0.076*** 0.069*** 0.015**
[0.028] [0.015] [0.008] [0.030] [0.015] [0.007] [0.028] [0.016] [0.007] [0.028] [0.015] [0.008]
0.038 0.05 0.020* 0.175* 0.032 0.011 0.152 0.037 0.019 0.154* 0.055* 0.016
[0.098] [0.029] [0.011] [0.090] [0.025] [0.011] [0.092] [0.027] [0.013] [0.093] [0.030] [0.011]
Wage Gap -0.263*** -0.159*** -0.037** -0.302*** -0.138*** -0.031** -0.276*** -0.133*** -0.041*** -0.219*** -0.149*** -0.031*
[0.070] [0.031] [0.015] [0.070] [0.030] [0.014] [0.068] [0.033] [0.014] [0.069] [0.031] [0.016]
Fertility Rate 0.102 -0.031 -0.037 -0.095 0.011 -0.015 -0.057 0.002 -0.031 -0.127 -0.037 -0.026
[0.192] [0.060] [0.029] [0.171] [0.044] [0.026] [0.176] [0.056] [0.030] [0.177] [0.058] [0.028]
Constant 0.491*** 0.409*** 0.170*** 0.382*** 0.426*** 0.178*** 0.414*** 0.426*** 0.183*** 0.513*** 0.413*** 0.177***
[0.042] [0.026] [0.025] [0.045] [0.027] [0.024] [0.041] [0.032] [0.025] [0.045] [0.026] [0.023]
-0.142 -0.100 -0.061*** 0.032 -0.134*** -0.073*** -0.037 -0.141*** -0.069*** -0.207*** -0.111* -0.073***
[0.109] [0.064] [0.016] [0.123] [0.056] [0.013] [0.112] [0.054] [0.017] [0.089] [0.060] [0.013]
Country Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Specific Time Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 339 339 307 339 339 307 337 337 305 339 339 307
R-squared 0.848 0.985 0.85 0.985 0.855 0.986 0.849 0.985
Number of Countries 16 14 16 14 16 14 16 14
Hausman / Sargan tests (p-values) 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 -
*Statistically significant at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, *** at the .01 level.
Average Minimum-to-Mean Wage 
Ratio
Lagged Adult Female Employment
Lagged Min-to-Median Wage Ratio 
Hotels/Restaurants Minimum-to-Mean 
Wage Ratio
Food/Bakery Minimum-to-Mean 
Wage Ratio
Minimum Wage Elasticity
Notes: See notes for Table 3 in the main text. The minimum-to-mean wage ratios shown are from Skedinger (2010) and pertain to 20 year-old unskilled blue-collar workers with no experience. The
values in the first column are averages across six sectors comprising   engineering, construction, and slaughter houses in addition to those shown in the next three columns.
Appendix Table 2.  Estimates of the Standard Minimum Wage Model of Employment Using International Data, Including Nordic Countries with Revised Data for Sweden
Adult Male Unemployment Rate
Wage Gap
Fertility Rate
Lagged Minimum-to-Median Wage Ratio interacted with:
Retail Minimum-to-Mean Wage 
RatioVariable
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Variable
Lagged Adult Female Unemployment 0.691*** 0.663***
[0.075] [0.088]
Lagged Minimum-to-Median Wage Ratio -0.005 -0.025 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.046*** 0.046***
[0.015] [0.023] [0.024] [0.048] [0.036] [0.015] [0.015]
Adult Male Unemployment Rate 1.029*** 0.745*** 0.822*** 0.732*** 0.704*** 0.388*** 0.395***
[0.084] [0.080] [0.092] [0.081] [0.076] [0.070] [0.075]
Wage Gap 0.021*** -0.008 -0.020* -0.011
[0.005] [0.008] [0.010] [0.007]
Fertility Rate 0.027* -0.130*** -0.030 -0.019*
[0.014] [0.038] [0.044] [0.011]
Wage Gap -0.054*** 0.015 0.044* 0.017
[0.013] [0.017] [0.024] [0.014]
Fertility Rate -0.151*** 0.126* -0.023 0.017
[0.025] [0.072] [0.079] [0.029]
Constant 0.000 0.093*** 0.005 0.01 0.039** -0.021** -0.008
[0.008] [0.015] [0.010] [0.024] [0.018] [0.009] [0.012]
Minimum Wage Elasticity 0.021 -0.044** 0.033 0.034 0.032*** 0.046*** 0.042***
[0.031] [0.021[ [0.024] [0.048] [0.018[ [0.015] [0.007]
Country Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Specific Time Trends NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 339 339 339 339 339 307 307
R-squared 0.697 0.88 0.847 0.863 0.881
Number of Countries 16 16 14 14
Hausman / Sargan tests (p-values) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 -
Appendix Table 3.  Estimates of the Standard Minimum Wage Model Using International Data for the Unemployment Outcome
GMMFE
Lagged Minimum-to-Median Wage Ratio interacted with:
*Statistically significant at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, *** at the .01 level.
OLS
Notes:   See Notes to Table 3 and Table 4
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OLS FE GMM
Lagged Adult Female Employment 0.576***
[0.067]
Lagged Min to Median Wage Ratio -0.607*** -0.279** -0.253***
[0.117] [0.116] [0.057]
Adult Male Unemployment Rate -0.707*** -0.491*** -0.360***
[0.101] [0.094] [0.045]
Wage Gap -0.010 0.059*** 0.032***
[0.024] [0.018] [0.009]
Fertility Rate 0.065 -0.052 -0.040**
[0.049] [0.046] [0.020]
Bargained Minimum Wage 0.427*** 0.046
[0.061] [0.153]
Youth Subminimum -0.401***
[0.078]
Subnational Minimum -0.348***
[0.081]
Employment Protection  Index -0.084*** -0.068 -0.051*
[0.026] [0.058] [0.027]
Union Density 0.001 -0.019 -0.007
[0.019] [0.021] [0.008]
Unemp. Insurance Replacement Rate -0.020 -0.095** -0.104***
[0.026] [0.034] [0.026]
Active Labor Market Policies 0.010 -0.002 -0.021
[0.019] [0.016] [0.015]
Labor Standards Index -0.043
[0.049]
Appendix Table 4. Estimates of the Augmented Minimum Wage Model with Characteristics of Minimum Wage Systems and Other Labor Market  
Policies and Institutions on Employment, Excluding Nordic Countries
Variable
continues on the next page
Adult Female Employment-to-Population Ratio
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Wage Gap -0.023 -0.125*** -0.062***
[0.052] [0.040] [0.020]
Fertility Rate 0.009 0.142 0.067
[0.096] [0.118] [0.045]
Bargained Minimum Wage -0.640*** -0.496* -0.430**
[0.118] [0.256] [0.209]
Youth Subminimum 0.489*** 0.232 0.223***
[0.140] [0.136] [0.068]
Subnational Minimum 0.493*** 0.381 0.347**
[0.152] [0.239] [0.142]
Employment Protection Index 0.054 0.128 0.096*
[0.051] [0.103] [0.049]
Union Density -0.036 0.027 0.001
[0.036] [0.033] [0.015]
Unemp.Insurance Replacement Rate -0.007 0.142** 0.187***
[0.045] [0.062] [0.051]
Active Labor Market Policies -0.013 0.019 0.048
[0.038] [0.033] [0.032]
Labor Standards Index 0.030 -0.102 -0.177*
[0.081] [0.161] [0.103]
Constant 0.675*** 0.340*** 0.142**
[0.051] [0.052] [0.063]
Minimum Wage Elasticity -0.464 -0.210 -0.169
0.110 0.097 0.098
Country Fixed Effects NO YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Country Specific Time Trends YES YES YES
Observations 319 319 291
R-squared 0.981 0.99
Number of Countries 13 13
Hausman / Sargan tests (p-values)
*Statistically significant at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, *** at the .01 level.
continues from the previous page
Lagged Minimum to Median Wage Ratio interacted with:
Notes:   See Notes to Table 4
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OLS FE GMM OLS FE GMM OLS FE GMM OLS FE GMM
Lagged Adult Female Employment 0.592*** 0.588*** 0.589*** 0.590***
[0.071] [0.070] [0.067] [0.071]
Lagged Min to Median Wage Ratio -1.634*** -0.382*** -0.338*** -1.397*** -0.333** -0.311*** -1.374*** -0.351** -0.323*** -1.641*** -0.369***-0.310***
[0.159] [0.126] [0.080] [0.125] [0.123] [0.076] [0.133] [0.123] [0.081] [0.162] [0.129] [0.076]
Adult Male Unemployment Rate -0.807*** -0.527*** -0.369*** -0.814*** -0.526*** -0.366*** -0.775*** -0.524*** -0.364*** -0.869*** -0.537***-0.367***
[0.109] [0.097] [0.049] [0.099] [0.097] [0.048] [0.099] [0.098] [0.049] [0.113] [0.098] [0.048]
Wage Gap -0.005 0.057*** 0.026*** 0.002 0.056*** 0.026*** -0.002 0.056*** 0.024*** 0.015 0.059*** 0.026**
[0.028] [0.019] [0.009] [0.024] [0.016] [0.007] [0.023] [0.016] [0.008] [0.027] [0.018] [0.007]
Fertility Rate -0.030 -0.014 -0.023 0.111*** -0.009 -0.022 0.070 -0.01 -0.027* 0.020 0.016 -0.018
[0.056] [0.041] [0.017] [0.047] [0.039] [0.016] [0.045] [0.039] [0.016] [0.064] [0.041] [0.016]
Bargained Minimum Wage 0.298*** -0.043 0.430*** 0.026 0.434*** -0.011 0.312*** 0.001
[0.078] [0.044] [0.065] [0.042] [0.064] [0.044] [0.085] [0.044]
Youth Subminimum -0.789*** -0.725*** -0.737*** -0.758***
[0.091] [0.071] [0.077] [0.094]
Subnational Minimum -0.686*** -0.688*** -0.721*** -0.633***
[0.094] [0.071] [0.068] [0.108]
Employment Protection  Index -0.103*** -0.042 -0.028 -0.088*** -0.044 -0.027 -0.089*** -0.038 -0.026 -0.120*** -0.039 -0.024
[0.026] [0.047] [0.023] [0.023] [0.038] [0.020] [0.024] [0.040] [0.019] [0.027] [0.040] [0.019]
Union Density 0.004 -0.026 -0.007 0.001 -0.025 -0.007 0.011 -0.025 -0.007 -0.003 -0.029 -0.007
[0.022] [0.022] [0.009] [0.019] [0.021] [0.019] [0.021] [0.009] [0.023] [0.023] [0.009]
Unemp. Insurance Replacement Rate -0.014 -0.101** -0.087*** 0.006 -0.108*** 0.013 -0.107** -0.087*** -0.015 -0.095** -0.087***
[0.034] [0.037] [0.019] [0.027] [0.035] [0.017] [0.027] [0.037] [0.022] [0.036] [0.036] [0.019]
Active Labor Market Policies 0.010 0.005 0.001 -0.003 0.009 0.003 -0.017* 0.008 0.004 0.016 0.008 0.003
[0.014] [0.007] [0.003] [0.010] [0.006] [0.003] [0.010] [0.006] [0.004] [0.013] [0.006] [0.003]
Labor Standards Index 0.035 -0.054 -0.087** 0.095
[0.064] [0.043] [0.044] [0.071]
Variable
Average Minimum-to-Mean 
Wage Ratio
Retail Minimum-to-Mean 
Wage Ratio
Appendix Table 5. Estimates of the Augmented Minimum Wage Model with Characteristics of Minimum Wage Systems and Other Labor Market  Policies and 
Institutions on Employment,  Including Nordic Countries with Revised Data for Sweden
Hotels/Restaurants Minimum-
to-Mean Wage Ratio
Food/Bakery Minimum-to-
Mean Wage Ratio
continues on the next page
[0.009]
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Lagged Minimum to Median Wage Ratio interacted with:
Wage Gap -0.078 -0.119** -0.050** -0.069 -0.117*** -0.048*** -0.059 -0.116*** -0.045*** -0.128** -0.124***-0.049***
[0.058] [0.042] [0.021] [0.050] [0.035] [0.016] [0.049] [0.036] [0.017] [0.054] [0.040] [0.017]
Fertility Rate 0.0980 0.040 0.0230 -0.159* 0.0350 0.0260 -0.0360 0.0360 0.0350 -0.0460 -0.020 0.0170
[0.098] [0.104] [0.038] [0.091] [0.099] [0.036] [0.089] [0.098] [0.037] [0.112] [0.100] [0.037]
Bargained Minimum Wage -0.461*** -0.393** -0.273*** -0.663*** -0.454*** -0.292*** -0.659*** -0.405** -0.263*** -0.517*** -0.447** -0.293***
[0.138] [0.163] [0.103] [0.116] [0.151] [0.099] [0.117] [0.155] [0.099] [0.147] [0.157] [0.098]
Youth Subminimum 1.414*** 0.310* 0.277*** 1.199*** 0.265 0.252** 1.208*** 0.275 0.262*** 1.374*** 0.300 0.247**
[0.175] [0.167] [0.102] [0.139] [0.163] [0.099] [0.145] [0.165] [0.098] [0.177] [0.178] [0.098]
Subnational Minimum 1.480*** 0.520*** 0.431*** 1.312*** 0.400*** 0.366*** 1.356*** 0.450*** 0.399*** 1.411*** 0.455*** 0.362***
[0.159] [0.130] [0.072] [0.130] [0.126] [0.069] [0.129] [0.127] [0.086] [0.178] [0.138] [0.071]
Employment Protection Index 0.076 0.072 0.046 0.045 0.078 0.044 0.055 0.067 0.042 0.100* 0.070 0.040
[0.051] [0.077] [0.040] [0.046] [0.059] [0.034] [0.048] [0.062] [0.030] [0.054] [0.063] [0.030]
Union Density -0.039 0.040 0.002 -0.038 0.038 0.001 -0.060* 0.039 0.000 -0.023 0.044 0.001
[0.038] [0.035] [0.016] [0.033] [0.034] [0.016] [0.033] [0.034] [0.017] [0.040] [0.037] [0.017]
Unemp.Insurance Replacement Rate -0.027 0.155** 0.153*** -0.050 0.166** 0.151*** -0.059 0.164** 0.153*** -0.027 0.144* 0.152***
[0.061] [0.069] [0.037] [0.050] [0.064] [0.033] [0.049] [0.067] [0.044] [0.064] [0.068] [0.036]
Active Labor Market Policies 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.019 -0.004 -0.001 0.045*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.001 0.000
[0.021] [0.010] [0.003] [0.015] [0.009] [0.003] [0.016] [0.009] [0.011] [0.019] [0.008] [0.003]
Labor Standards Index -0.033 -0.012 -0.071 0.077 -0.063 -0.088** 0.126* -0.033 -0.073* -0.130 -0.029 -0.087**
[0.100] [0.090] [0.043] [0.070] [0.081] [0.035] [0.072] [0.085] [0.038] [0.110] [0.080] [0.035]
Constant 1.136*** 0.373*** 0.154*** 1.020*** 0.382*** 0.169*** 1.006*** 0.376*** 0.159*** 1.142*** 0.381*** 0.169***
[0.070] [0.041] [0.049] [0.056] [0.035] [0.051] [0.059] [0.038] [0.045] [0.071] [0.038] [0.049]
Minimum Wage Elasticity -1.002*** -0.233** -0.199*** -0.843*** -0.228*** -0.194*** -0.833** -0.227*** -0.194*** -1.009*** -0.235***-0.194***
[0.376] [0.111] [0.079] [0.370] [0.101] [0.074] [0.396] [0.104] [0.077] [0.349] [0.104] [0.074]
Country Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Specific Time Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 339 339 307 339 339 307 337 337 305 339 339 307
R-squared 0.976 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.981 0.99 0.975 0.989
Number of Countries 16 14 16 14 16 14 16 14
Hausman / Sargan tests (p-values) 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 -
*Statistically significant at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, *** at the .01 level.
Notes: See Notes to Table 4. The minimum-to-mean wage ratios shown are from Skedinger (2010) and pertain to 20 year-old unskilled blue-collar workers with no
experience. The values in the first column are averages across six sectors comprising engineering, construction, and slaughter houses in addition to those shown in the
next three columns.
continues from the previous page
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Variable
Lagged Adult Female Unemployment 0.580*** 0.571***
[0.064] [0.067]
Lagged Min-to-Median Wage Ratio -0.009 0.054 0.015 -0.055 0.118*** 0.073*
[0.091] [0.072] [0.114] [0.087] [0.049] [0.040]
Adult Male Unemployment Rate 0.860*** 0.812*** 0.659*** 0.637*** 0.416*** 0.412***
[0.093] [0.077] [0.089] [0.086] [0.074] [0.071]
Wage Gap 0.058*** 0.010 -0.007
[0.015] [0.022] [0.009]
Fertility Rate -0.104*** 0.012 0.005
[0.029] [0.035] [0.016]
Bargained Minimum Wage -0.211*** -0.115*** -0.064 -0.076
[0.039] [0.035] [0.061] [0.062]
Youth Subminimum 0.087 0.100**
[0.062] [0.050]
Subnational Minimum 0.132*** 0.049
[0.051] [0.045]
Employment Protection  Index 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.049 0.051 0.026** 0.026*
[0.017] [0.018] [0.045] [0.053] [0.013] [0.015]
Union Density 0.020** 0.034*** 0.041* 0.032 0.012 0.006
[0.011] [0.012] [0.023] [0.020] [0.009] [0.009]
Unemp. Insurance Replacement Rate 0.126*** 0.076*** 0.037 0.041 0.019 0.029***
[0.021] [0.017] [0.030] [0.025] [0.014] [0.009]
Active Labor Market Policies -0.017 -0.024*** -0.017 -0.014 0.001 0.003
[0.014] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
Labor Standards Index 0.046* 0.060***
[0.024] [0.021]
Appendix Table 6.  Estimates of the Augmented Minimum Wage Model with Characteristics of Minimum Wage Systems and Other 
Labor Market  Policies and Institutions for the Unemployment Outcome
continues on the next page
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Wage Gap -0.109*** -0.028 0.006
[0.032] [0.048] [0.020]
Fertility Rate 0.101** -0.069 -0.022
[0.060] [0.071] [0.031]
Bargained Minimum Wage 0.359*** 0.265*** 0.305* 0.265 0.230*** 0.207**
[0.079] [0.072] [0.158] [0.181] [0.080] [0.084]
Youth Subminimum -0.086 -0.186* -0.133 -0.076 -0.137* -0.086
[0.112] [0.095] [0.126] [0.109] [0.073] [0.061]
Subnational Minimum -0.229** -0.164* -0.176 -0.104 -0.164*** -0.142***
[0.107] [0.095] [0.125] [0.142] [0.051] [0.052]
Employment Protection Index -0.033 -0.062* -0.079 -0.094 -0.042+ -0.045
[0.030] [0.033] [0.090] [0.103] [0.024] [0.028]
Union Density -0.01 -0.038 -0.063 -0.046 -0.012 -0.001
[0.024] [0.023] [0.044] [0.040] [0.018] [0.018]
Unemp. Insurance Replacement Rate -0.181*** -0.096*** -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.023
[0.037] [0.030] [0.071] [0.062] [0.032] [0.024]
Active Labor Market Policies 0.026 0.042** 0.023 0.02 -0.006 -0.009
[0.027] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.014] [0.014]
Labor Standards Index -0.165*** -0.170*** -0.078 -0.073 -0.001 0.003
[0.042] [0.037] [0.085] [0.098] [0.036] [0.036]
Constant 0.054 0.066** 0.097** 0.116** 0.014 0.027
[0.040] [0.030] [0.037] [0.045] [0.015] [0.018]
Minimum Wage Elasticity -0.030 0.011 -0.004 -0.039 0.080 0.051
0.140 0.123 0.060 0.060 0.035 0.032
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Specific Time Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 339 339 339 339 307 307
R-squared 0.935 0.951 0.919 0.923
Number of Countries 16 16 14 14
Hausman / Sargan tests (p-values) 0.000 0.001 --
Lagged Minimum to Median Wage Ratio interacted with:
*Statistically significant at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, *** at the .01 level.
continues from the previous page
Notes:   See Notes to Table 3 and Table 4
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